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Abstract: Block proposes that phenomenal experience overflows
conscious access. In contrast, we propose that conscious access
overflows overt report. We argue that a theory of phenomenal
experience cannot discard subjective report and that Block’s examples
of phenomenal “overflow” relate to two different types of perception.
We propose that conscious access is more than simply readout of a pre-
existing phenomenal experience.
Visual presentation of a face can elicit strong activity in the fusi-
form gyrus even when a patient with neglect does not see it (Rees
et al. 2000). Block’s proposition that recurrent sensory activations
constitute the core neural basis of phenomenal experience leads
him to the following prediction:
[I]f the activations of the fusiform area [. . .] in the patient G.K. turn out
to be recurrent activations, we would have evidence for phenomenal
experience that the subject not only does not know about, but in
these circumstances cannot know about. (target article, sect. 14,
para. 13)
In other words, the experimenter could detect phenomenal
experience in a patient’s brain even if the patient denies having
that experience! This contradicts the notion of phenomenal
experience itself, which is, by definition, a subjective, first-
person experience. We suggest that any theory of phenomenal
experience that discards subjective report as its fundamental
measure is bound to lead to such contradictory predictions.
It is crucial to distinguish different forms of accessibility. In
experiments using backward masking (Lau & Passingham 2006;
Vorberg et al. 2003), when subjects are pressed to guess which
stimulus has been presented they can perform better than
chance, even when they claim they have not seen it. In this
case, as in classical “blindsight” (Weiskrantz 1997), there is a
clear distinction between two types of report: objective report
(accessibility in a direct sense, probably via automatic stimulus-
response routes) and subjective report (accessibility as defined
in the term “conscious access”). We propose that this latter
form of accessibility is intrinsic to what Block calls phenomenal
consciousness.
In our view, the real challenge lies in designing tools to allow
an objective, scientific measure of subjective report (Dennett
1992). Indeed, this is already an active area of study (Dienes &
Scott 2005; Macmillan & Creelman 1991; Persaud et al. 2007;
Sergent et al. 2005; Sergent & Dehaene 2004; Weiskrantz
1997) and could in principle produce biomarkers of conscious-
ness that allow report of phenomenal experience in the
absence of overt report, via external brain imaging devices (Nac-
cache 2006b; Nachev & Husain 2007; Owen et al. 2006).
Block makes extensive use of partial-report paradigms
(Landman et al. 2003; Sperling 1960) to support the argument
that phenomenal experience overflows conscious accessibility.
While an observer viewing such a letter array appears to “see it
all,” uncued report of the individual letters a short time later is
poor. Nevertheless, a cue occurring after the array has been pre-
sented can lead to excellent recall of letter identity for the cued
subset of the array. This excellent cued recall does not entail – as
Block argues – that the earlier “seeing it all” experience there-
fore reflects phenomenal experience of all the letters at the
same level of detail. Instead, we suggest that cued recall not
only reflects readout of a fading information buffer, but it is a
modification of perception through attention that does not
differ much from classical sensory modulation by spatial atten-
tion (Ruff et al., in press). Although only the cued letters
receive this additional attentional enhancement, the claim of
“seeing it all” might still be based on access to lower-level attri-
butes that are not explicitly probed by the experimenter – for
example, presence of the uncued stimuli, rough recognition as
“alphanumeric characters,” or “Gestalt” properties of the scene
gist. The apparent intuition lying behind phenomenal conscious-
ness might therefore simply refer to access itself being much
greater in some situations than the specific report required by
the experimenter.
Strong sensory processing is consistently observed even when
observers deny any form of experience of the stimulus. For
example, the “attentional blink” describes impairment in report-
ing the second of two visual targets when they are separated by a
short interval. Sergent and colleagues asked subjects to evaluate
the visibility of a target word during the attentional blink on a
continuous scale going from 0 to 100% visibility. If there were
any form of experience of the target, even feeble or partial,
they could acknowledge that by using intermediate visibility
levels. However, missing a target corresponded to a subjective
rating of zero, just as when no word was presented (Sergent &
Dehaene 2004). Nevertheless, these “zero-visibility” words eli-
cited strong, long-lasting brain potentials up to 300 msecs after
they had been presented (Sergent et al. 2005), a time scale at
which local recurrent loops ought to have been established
(Lamme & Roelfsema 2000). Therefore, strong and elaborate
processing within sensory areas is not sufficient for subjective
experience.
In summary, we believe that what Block calls “phenomenal
consciousness” actually reflects two different situations:
1. Genuinely unconscious stimuli that nevertheless receive
strong sensory processing: this type of stimuli can influence our
conscious mental life (Dehaene et al. 1998; Gaillard et al. 2006;
Greenwald et al. 2003), but are not directly conscious.
2. Conscious stimuli that do not receive full attention and for
which conscious access is partial to only certain attributes of the
stimuli.
Finally, Block argues that activity in fronto-parietal areas does
not reflect the core neural basis of consciousness and instead con-
stitutes “read out” of the perceptual state represented in occipito-
temporal areas. But the empirical evidence does not support a
clear distinction between “perceptual” and “report” areas. For
example, enhanced connectivity between fronto-parietal and
visual cortices is associated with fluctuations in conscious con-
tents during binocular rivalry (Lumer et al. 1998; Srinivasan
et al. 1999) even when observers are not required to make any
covert or overt reports of their experience (Lumer & Rees
1999). Therefore, the evidence points to an active interaction
among frontal, parietal, and sensory areas that altogether consti-
tute conscious perception (Dehaene et al. 2003; 2006; Rees et al.
2002a).
In conclusion, we are far from understanding the complexity of
the neural mechanisms that underlie our rich subjective experi-
ence of the external world, and Block’s article provides a stimu-
lating reminder of the path that lies ahead. But, in our view, the
study of conscious access through careful assessment of subjec-
tive reports is the most positive and promising movement in
that direction so far.
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